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CONFLICT OF LAWS AND ELECTIONS IN ADMINISTRATION
OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES
EUGENE F. SCOLESt
The problem of election arises whenever a person has a choice of in-
consistent interests in the same subject matter, and in the administration
of decedents' estates it usually concerns whether or not a widow can
claim dower and also take the provisions for her in the will. At early
common law the presumption was that she could.' The growth of this
presumption had its roots in England during a period in which land could
not be willed;2 an heir at that time took personalty by will and land by
descent so no inconsistency was perceived in receiving benefits by both.'
The states of the United States have, with three exceptions, reversed the
common law by a statutory presumption that a devise or bequest in a
will is deemed in lieu of dower, or statutory rights; and the widow must
elect to take dower or be bound by the will.4  Vermont retains the com-
mon law presumption so that the widow may take both dower and the
benefits under the will unless the testator clearly indicates in his will that
the gift is in lieu of dower.' To a lesser extent Georgia has the same rule.
t Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 7.1, 7.34 (1952) ; DAGGETT, THE COmmUNITY
PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 95 (1945); DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY § 1 (1943).
2. I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 724 (1952); 2 SCRIBNER, DOWER 444 (2d ed.
1883).
3. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 743 (3d ed. 1947) ; DICEY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 552, 834 (6th ed. 1949) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 522 (3d ed. 1949) ; GRAVE-
SON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 337 (1952). See It re Olgilvie, 87 L.J. Ch. 363, [1918] 1 Ch.
492.
4. I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.41 (1952); ATKINSON, THEE LAW OF WILLS §
33 (2d ed. 1953). See, e.g, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. 152-5-5 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. § 731.35
(1953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-301 (Burns Repl. 1953); MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 191, § 15
(1932); MICr. Comp. LAWS § 702.69 (1948); N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 18; VA. CODE §
64-31 (1950).
5. VT. REV. STAT. § 3031 (1947) ; Phillips v. Northfield Trust Co., 107 Vt. 243, 179
AtI. 154 (1935) ; In re O'Rourke's Estate, 106 Vt. 327, 175 AtI. 24 (1934). In the Phillips
case, the court stated: "The common-law rule is that in the absence of an express or im-
plied intention on the part of the testator that his widow should elect between her lawful
rights in his property and the provisions made for her in his will, she shall take both. So
far as her homestead and dower rights are concerned, it has been the established rule of
this jurisdiction that she takes both unless it clearly appears that such was not the inten-
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Georgia's statute provides that, while a devise is deemed in lieu of dower,
a bequest is not.' The third variation of consequence occurs in Utah,
where testamentary provisions for the widow are deemed in lieu of her
statutory share, but, unless the widow elects to take under the will, she
receives her statutory share.' If a decedent domiciled elsewhere dies
owning land in one of these three states, there is the possibility that his
widow may take under the will at the domicile and never be put to an
election in Vermont or Georgia, while her failure to act at the domicile
may constitute an election to statutory share in Utah. Such a frustration
of the testamentary scheme could result from a blind application of the
rule that the law of the situs governs all questions of disposition of land;
the widow, moreover, would receive more than the statutory amount
given her by any of the states. Fortunately, the possibility of opposing
presumptions has been removed by legislative action in most states and
may soon disappear in even these last three states.8
Even without the presence of inconsistent statutory presumptions
other conflict of laws problems exist in relation to these elections. It is
often necessary, for example, to decide whether the will puts a particular
claimant to an election. In such a case, it may be necessary to decide
whether the law of the forum, of the domicile, or of the situs shall deter-
mine the effective construction of a will allegedly barring the claimant
from a statutory interest in addition to whatever is received under the
will.' Likewise, it may be necessary to choose between the law of the
testator's domicile at death, or that of his domicile at the time he ex-
ecuted the will, or even that law which he stated to be applicable to his
will."
Should it be assumed that an election must be made, it remains to be
decided whether the claimant has already elected or still has the oppor-
tunity to do so. In this situation the court may be required to decide if
acts in another state amount to an election, there or at the forum, and the
tion of the testator. . . . If the will leaves the matter in doubt, the widow is given the
benefit of that doubt and she takes both." Id. at 247, 179 At. at 156.
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-103 (1933).
7. UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-4-4 (1953).
8. Several states have recently adopted statutory changes according with the ma-jority view. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. § 59-2233 (1949), as amended, KAN. GEN. STAT.§ 59-2233 (Supp. 1951); R.I. GEN. LAWS 566, § 21 (1938), as amended, R. I. Acts and
Resolves, Jan. Sess., 1942, c. 1119, p. 7.
9. See Heilman, Interpretation and Construction of Wills of Inznovables in Con-
flict of Laws Cases Involving "Election," 25 ILL. L. REv. 778 (1930) ; RESTATEMiENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 253 (1934).
10. See Staigg v. Atkinson, 144 Mass. 564, 12 N.E. 354 (1887) ; STUMBERB, CONFLICT
OF LAws 424 (2d ed. 1951).
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effect.1 In addition to these problems of election, the variation in the
laws of different states may cause a will to be valid in one state and in-
valid in another.12 In case of partial invalidity a beneficiary may have
to elect between his interests under the will and under the statute, as the
consequence of the merely fortuitous location of the testator's assets.
The share of a forced heir, such as the widow, is usually determined,
as to existence and extent, by the law of the decedent's domicile in the
case of movables and that of the situs in the case of immovables." If the
same dual governing law obtained in cases involving elections, anomalous
results would often occur. To avoid this possibility there has been con-
siderable emphasis on the deceased's domiciliary law for both movables
and immovables, and this recognition of the need for a single reference
has resulted because of the policies having force in this particular area.
Estate election problems require the court to strike a balance between
the need for adhering to the testator's scheme of distribution while giving
the surviving spouse, or some other beneficiary, the desired and legally
assured protection. The function of the court is to see that this accom-
modation is made with justice and fairness to all the beneficiaries of the
estate. This balance between opposing local law policies is achieved by
providing that the beneficiary's claims must not be inconsistent, and this
consistency is required in regard to all parts of the estate wherever lo-
cated. This is an application of the policy favoring uniformity in ad-
ministration of parts of the whole estate. Some alteration of the testa-
tor's plan becomes necessary whenever an interest is taken against the will.
The application of the doctrine of election in conflict of laws cases should
keep the distortion of the testamentary scheme to the minimum permitted
by the law of the state having-the dominant interest in the family. Elec-
tion should not be thought of as having an automatic, slot machine effect
which depends on the beneficiary's act, but, rather, the purposes behind
the possibly applicable doctrine should be explored thoroughly to deter-
mine the extent of its actual application. It should be possible for the
beneficiary to alter her position or election if later facts show the initial
choice was a poor one, because the surviving spouse, or children, has the
favored position in the law and because conflict of laws policies are prob-
ably satisfied if consistency is achieved by the final result. In cases in
which variant standards are available under different possibly applicable
11. Security Trust Co. v. Hanby, 32 Del. Ch. 70, 79 A.2d 807 (1951) ; see also 1
WOERNER, TII AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION 396-398 (3d ed. 1923); GOODRIcH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 521 (3d ed. 1949).
12. McGehee v. MeGehee, 189 N.C. 558, 127 S.E. 684 (1925) ; Van Dyke's Appeal,
60 Pa. 481 (1869).
13. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 501 et seq. (3d ed. 1949) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS §§ 248, 301 (1934) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 409 et seq. (2d ed. 1951).
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laws, the law of the decedent's domicile normally should be the guide in
view of the connection and enduring relationship between the family and
the state.
A. EFFECT OF ELECTION MADE IN DOMICILIARY ADMINISTRATION
As to immovables in ancillary administration
The most important area of controversy concerning elections made
in administration of decedents' estates is that in which the widow either
takes under the will or renounces at the domicile, and the effect of this
action is raised in ancillary administration of immovables located in an-
other state. The situation in which the claimant takes under the will at
the domicile and then attempts to claim dower or statutory share in ancil-
lary administration will be considered first. In Brooks v. Carson ' the
Kansas court held that the effect of acts at the domicile in Massachusetts,
such as not filing an express election and taking benefits under the will,
controlled any possible election at the situs of land. Since the widow
could not claim against the will in Massachusetts, she could not do so in
Kansas. An analogous case arose in Louisiana, where children are forced
heirs. 5 After receiving $1,000 as legatee in a domiciliary probate in
Iowa, the deceased's daughter claimed that she was entitled to a forced
share under the law of Louisiana, where the deceased had left an im-
movable asset valued at $500. She asserted the share was one-third the
value of the estate located everywhere or, in the alternative, one-third of
the value of the Louisiana land. The court held that she had renounced
the Louisiana succession by her acceptance of the benefits of the will in
Iowa. In each of these cases the courts of the situs governed the ancillary
election by the domiciliary result.
A case illustrating the dangers of ignoring a foreign election is the
Missouri case of Lee's Summit Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Cross.' In this
case the owner died domiciled in California, where her husband probated
her will and took the benefits which it provided for him. The testatrix
had devised Missouri land to her daughter, then seven years old. The
husband, however, filed an election against the will in Missouri and
claimed one-half the land under the Missouri statute. No one objected,
and he later conveyed to the loan association. Thirteen years later, in a
partition suit against the daughter, the loan association was held to have
received no title from the husband because he had not effectively re-
14. 166 Kan. 194, 200 P.2d 280 (1948) ; see also Martin v. Battey, 87 Kan. 582, 125
Pac. 88 (1912).
15. Jarel v. Moon's Succession, 190 So. 867 (La. App. 1939).
16. 345 Mo. 501, 134 S.W.2d 19 (1939).
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nounced the will."7 The potential hardship to third parties when matters
of forced share are not conclusively settled during administration, which
this case indicates, and the practical problems of checking title to real
estate, would make a court's application of the law of the situs seem
reasonable in analogous cases involving elections and third parties. The
purchaser of the realty would be protected and the child left to a suit
against the father's estate for his fraud.
While the purchasing public should be protected by their reliance
upon the law of the situs, no need exists, in litigation actually occurring
during administration of the estate, for looking only to the law of the
situs, as a Nebraska case well illustrates." There the spouses while domi-
ciled in California had released their claims to each other's property in
return for cross life estates in certain pieces of realty. After the death
of the husband in California, the widow, then incompetent, elected by
her guardian to take dower in her husband's Nebraska lands. The
Nebraska court denied the claim and held the widow bound by the Cali-
fornia contract. While the case does not directly involve an election in
administration, it is closely analogous, and the court, citing Polson v.
Stewart,0 indicated the limitations upon application of the situs rule:
"The principle that the le: rei sitae, as such, governs as to real property
is also subject to an exception as to obligations which, although in relation
to real property, do not directly affect the title to or interest in the
property itself."2
From the cases it is clear that in nearly every instance accepting
benefits under the will at the domicile constitutes an election which pre-
cludes a claim of a forced share against the will at the situs. When the
case arises among the parties to an estate, this conclusion seems clearly
correct, at least in the absence of fraud or concealment of assets; con-
siderable hardship may occur, however, when third parties relying upon
the record at the situs purchase the land from the surviving spouse. In
such a case bona fide purchasers should be protected unless the local
record is sufficient to warn them.
Renunciation of the will in domiciliary administration has been held
in most cases to preclude the claimant from taking under the will at a
17. The court found reason for holding that no local renunciation had been made as
required under the Missouri statutes. Thus, they avoided an actual decision on the effect
of the California election. The daughter was required to account for improvements made
with the association's funds but even this partial remedy would not exist in many trans-
fers. Ibid.
18. Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277 N.W. 785 (1938).
19. 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897). In this case the court sustained a contract
regarding Massachusetts land between non-residents that would have been unenforceable
between residents.
20. Jorgensen v. Crandall, 134 Neb. 33, 39, 277 N.W. 785, 789 (1938).
297'
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
foreign situs. Confusion has arisen because of the specific requirements
of many state statutes that renunciation of the will and election to take
the statutory share must be filed in a particular manner and by a particular
time.' These same statutes usually provide that, in the absence of a
formal renunciation and election, the surviving spouse is entitled only to
the share provided for her in the will. The important case of Colvin v.
Hutchison2 concerns a situation arising under such a statute. The widow
filed a renunciation at the domicile in Illinois and elected to take her
dower and legal share under Illinois law. The will was also probated in
Missouri, where the decedent left real property, but the widow did nothing
there to indicate an election, though the Missouri statutes enabled her to
renounce her husband's will and take either dower or a child's part. A
short time later the widow died, and her heirs claimed a child's part, which
was one-half of the Missouri realty, against the devisee of the will of the
deceased husband. The court held that the Illinois renunciation was ef-
fective in Missouri since they found no requirement in the Missouri
statute for filing a renunciation. In this regard they stated:
But when she renounces the will, in the state of her resi-
dence, where its validity is established by probate, she renounces
it "in toto, everywhere and cannot take testamentary benefits
under it anywhere. At least, in the absence of a statute with
specific requirements, no filing of the renunciation elsewhere is
necessary. Likewise if she accepts it, in the state of her resi-
dence and its probate, she is bound by it everywhere and cannot
renounce it in some other state. This view is supported by
well-considered authority, and gives effect both to the principle
that title to real estate is governed by the laws of the state where
it is located and to the principles upon which the doctrine of
election is based.2
Even if it were assumed that the foreign renunciation was effective
in Missouri, the court was still faced with the question of which of the
two interests available under the statute, dower or child's share, the widow
would receive without an express election between them. They con-
cluded that, as to this point, an affirmative election was required by the
statutes of Missouri, in absence of which she would receive dower, that
is, a life estate in one-third of the land. This interest expired at her
21. See, e.g., statutes cited note 4 supra.
22. 338 Mo. 576, 92 S.W.2d 667 (1936). See also Huston v. Colonial Trust Co., 266
S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
23. Colvin v. Hutchison, 338 Mo. 576, 92 S.W.2d 667, 670 (1936).
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death so the husband's devisee prevailed over the widow's heirs. 4
The Missouri court's concern for the need of an affirmative election
at the situs between the interests given by the situs statute sugg.ests a
problem peculiar to the renunciation cases: Can a foreign election satisfy
both the requirements of renunciation and election? In brief, this re-
quires that both a negative effect, estoppel, and an affirmative effect,
election, be given the foreign action. In the cases involving acceptance,
only estoppel to a claim against the will is necessary since the will provides
the exact distributive share. Most courts that have considered it, indicate
that this is not an insuperable problem. The solution has been to find
renunciation or election by implication from unequivocal declarations or
acts in.another state showing such intent. A holding that an election in
Pennsylvania to take against the will constituted an implied election in
Delaware is found in Security Trust Co. v. Hanby.2" The Delaware statute
is not one which requires specific acts, but the court's reasoning was not
limited to cases under such statutes. The Pennsylvania election was held
to be binding on the widow because of equitable principles forbidding one
to take under and against the same instrument at the same time. The
statutes of several states, however, require specific affirmative acts; the
North Carolina statute, for example, requires dissent from the will to be
filed with the probating court within six months after probate and pro-
vides that it will have the effect of an election to take a forced share.26
In Coble v. Coble the North Carolina court held that an election made at
the domicile in South Carolina was effective as to land at the forum even
though the North Carolina statute was not satisfied by a local filing.7
In some cases the courts do not concern themselves with any distinc-
tion between election and renunciation but consider them co-existing. In
Russell v. Shapleigt,2 for example, a Massachusetts decedent left prop-
erty in both New Hampshire and Massachusetts; the Massachusetts court
assumed that the widow took a statutory share in New Hampshire after
renunciation and election to do so in Massachusetts. The court said:
* . we think that a widow's election to take her statutory rights in lieu
of provisions for her in her husband's will operates in all jurisdictions in
which he left property; that a man can leave but one will, although he
24. Clearly the interest which will be taken in land is governed by the situs as in the
Colvin case. See to same effect: In re Estate of Randolph, 175 Kan. 685, 266 P.2d 315(1954) ; Singleton v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 191 S.W.2d 143 (Tev. Civ. App. 1946) ;
Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, 115 N.J. Eq. 102, 169 Atl. 655, aff'd, 117 N.J. Eq. 397, 176
Atl. 112 (1934).
25. 32 Del. Ch. 70, 79 A.2d 807 (1951).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1, 30-2 (1943).
27. 227 N.C. 547, 42 S.E.2d 898 (1947).
28. 275 Mass. 15, 175 N.E. 100 (1931). See also Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, 115
N.J. Eq. 102, 169 Atl. 655, aff'd, 117 N.J. Eq. 397, 176 Atl. 112 (1934).
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may leave several testamentary writings; and that the widow's renuncia-
tion cannot be partial."2
Not all cases have reached a result which recognizes the estate as a
single unit. The Tennessee court in McGinnis v. Chambers,"0 under a
statute similar to those of North Carolina and New Hampshire, concluded
that the law of the situs governs land and that a renunciation and election
filed in Oklahoma, the decedent's domicile, did not satisfy the require-
ments of their own statute providing for renunciation and election of a
statutory share. Accordingly, the time for election in Tennessee having
expired, the widow could not claim dower but was bound by the will.
The confusion made possible by such a determination is illustrated by the
Maryland case of Bish v. Bish,2 ' in which the widow had renounced and
elected against the will in the Pennsylvania domiciliary administration.
The period in which an election could be made in Pennsylvania was longer
than that permitted in Maryland, where the deceased left real property,
and where the widow asserted a claim after the time had expired. The
court reasoned that satisfaction of the Maryland statute was a positive
requirement, that the renunciation in Pennsylvania had not come within
Maryland's statutory period, and that therefore the renunciation was in-
effective. Even though the will had no residuary clause and did not
mention the Maryland realty, the court concluded that she was to have a
life estate in the Maryland farm because she was to have a life estate in
other assets. This conclusion apparently bothered the court because the
widow would take against the will in one state and under it in another.
To correct this the court limited the total interest to be received by the
wife in both states to the value of the life estate as originally provided in
the will. This awkward conclusion which required a retaliatory decree
by a court in ancillary administration could have been avoided by giving
effect to the Pennsylvania election as an election by implication in
Maryland."
A lower court decision in Pennsylvania illustrates the possible results
which blind adherence to the situs rule can produce ;" the widow elected
against the estate in Pennsylvania, the domicile, but did nothing in
Florida, New Jersey, or Maine, where the decedent owned real estate,
which was sold so that the proceeds could be transmitted to Pennsylvania.
29. Russell v. Shapleigh, 275 Mass. 15, 20, 175 N.E. 100, 101 (1931).
30. 156 Tenn. 404, 1 S.W.2d 1015, 82 A.L.R. 1492, noted at 1509 (1928). See also
Rannels v. Rowe, 166 F. 425 (8th Cir. 1908) ; Apperson v. Bolton, 29 Ark. 418 (1874).
31. 181 Md. 621, 31 A.2d 348 (1943).
32. The court rather obviously, though not expressly, preferred to give effect to the
testator's intention rather than permit the widow to exercise her statutory privilege and
was willing to adopt the confusing course indicated to accomplish that end.
33. Eckel's Estate, 37 Pa. D. & C. 383, 56 Montg. 120, 88 Pitts. L.J. 321 (1940).
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The court held that the election was effective only as to assets in Penn-
sylvania, and the proceeds of the foreign land passed by the will under
which the wife took a life estate. While the court was probably correct
in its assumption that the proceeds came from the situs states "impressed
with the law of those jurisdictions governing its distribution," ' the
anomaly remains; the same court was distributing assets to one taking
both under and against the will.3" This might have been avoided had the
court not failed to consider that the other states might not apply their
local law provisions but rather, under their conflict of laws rules, might
give effect to the election made at the state of the domicile. 6
Considering the cases in which the claimant, at the domicile, has
either taken under the will or renounced, the binding strength of the
equitable doctrine of election is apparent. While the cases are not unani-
mous, it appears that in most instances the election at the domicile has
been conclusive upon the same person in ancillary administration. This
is the desirable result and protects the interests of all parties concerned
while preventing conflicting results because of fortuitous location of as-
sets. The cases seem to establish, without much question, that the nega-
tive aspects of the foreign election will be effective in nearly every in-
stance on an equitable estoppel concept. The primary question of diffi-
culty has been whether or not a person, barred from taking under the will,
can receive a benefit under a local statute with which he has not complied.
In view of the policy in favor of speedily settling estates, it seems rea-
sonable that the claimant be subject to some time limitations ;"7 also there
is need for fairly prompt action in order to avoid complicating the pro-
cedure for allowing creditors' claims since forced shares often have
priority. On the other hand, there is no other compulsion for action be-
fore distribution, so one might expect liberal extension of periods in
which an election might be made, and it seems desirable to extend the
34. Id. at 387, 56 Montg. at 126, 88 Pitts. L.J. at 325.
35. The fact that the estate was insolvent may explain in part the reason why no
attempt was made toward adjustment. Too, the court may have assumed that the widow's
rights under the will were prior to creditors as she had given value in loss of dower. Cf.
Muse v. Muse, 186 Va. 914, 45 S.E.2d 158 (1947) ; Moody and Moody, In Re: The Pre-
ferred Legatee, 25 BAR BtmL. 163 (Boston 1954).
36. Cf. Griley v. Griley, 43 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949) ; Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855,
170 So. 856 (1936) ; Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, 115 N.J. Eq. 102, 169 Atl. 655, aff'd,
117 N.J. Eq. 397, 176 Atl. 112 (1934).
37. The courts have often applied local statutes governing the time in which an
election can be made to permit the surviving spouse to claim a share in the estate. In so
doing they have usually concluded that the time is measured from the time of local pro-
bate of the will. Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936) ; In re Tamburri's
Will, 100 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1950). Cf. In re Will of Witt, 120 Kan. 200, 243 Pac. 296
(1926) ; Scripps v. Durfee, 131 Mich. 265, 90 N.W. 1061 (1902). See also 1 WOERNER,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 408.
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theory of election by implication to further the policies favoring unitary
treatment of estates. Third parties and creditors may be protected in
their reliance on local records as an exception to such a rule. In this
way protection of the regularity of local titles is provided when it is the
dominant policy, and the important policies of the testator's intention and
family protection can be accommodated fairly in the internal estate
controversies.
The purpose of family allowances practically removes it from the
area of the interstate election problems. Allowances are primarily to
provide support pending administration and, as such, are normally not
considered to be inconsistent with taking benefits under either the will
or statute. 8 Since there is ordinarily no requirement or reason to elect
between allowance privileges and the will, the petition for such an allow-
ance and its receipt at the domicile usually will have no effect in a conflicts
case. An example is an Indiana case where the court held that the widow's
petition and receipt of an allowance at the domicile in California would
not bar her from claiming her distributive share under the will in Indiana
ancillary administration. " In some states it is possible for the testator to
put the 'recipient of a statutory allowance to an election,4" but an express
provision is necessary to do so. In those states a reference to the domicile
of the deceased for the determination of the election question would be
expected and desirable since it would satisfy the policies favoring unitary
treatment of the estate and protection of the family in accordance with the
law of the state having the dominant interest.
Like family allowances, there are few conflict of laws problems con-
cerning elections to take homestead. These problems are particularly
local since the existence of homestead rights depend upon domicile at the
situs of the real property in question. Also, many states exclude the
homestead from the testamentary scheme in much the same manner as
family allowances. There are some states, however, that have made
homestead a substantial part of their scheme of testate and intestate
distribution, and a few of these have provided that a claimant cannot
38. In re Stachnick's Estate, 376 Pa. 592, 103 A.2d 765 (1954) ; In re O'Donnell's
Estate, 71 S.D. 339, 24 N.W.2d 326 (1946) ; In re Wahl's Estate, 236 Mo. App. 345, 158
S.W.2d 743 (1942); Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 68 R.I. 43, 26 A.2d 482 (1942);
Andros v. Flournoy, 22 N.M. 582, 166 Pac. 1173 (1917) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2307
(1953). See 1 WOERNER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 248.
39. Dick v. Glenn, 218 Ind. 282, 31 N.E.2d 1009, 32 N.E.2d 698 (1941).
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1007 (1933); ILL. SMITH Huan ANN. STAT. C. 3, § 334
(Supp. 1954); KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-403, 59-404 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. § 391.030
(1953) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 193, § 13 (1932) ; ME. REV. STAT. C. 156, §§ 14, 16 (1954) ;
MiCH. COmP. LAWS § 702.68 (Supp. 1952) ; N.H. REv. LAWS C. 359, § 1 (1942). See also
In the Matter of the Estate of Wenzel, 161 Kan. 545, 170 P.2d 618 (1946) ; Porter v.
Axline, 154 Kan. 87, 114 P.2d 849 (1941) ; In re Estate of David, 227 Iowa 352, 288 N.W.
418 (1939) ; Sturtevant v. Wentworth, 226 Mass. 459, 115 N.E. 927 (1917).
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take under both the will and homestead statute."1 More often it is pro-
vided that the claimant cannot take both dower and homestead. This
means that the substantive effect and scope of the statute at the domicile
and in states of ancillary administration, when they are alleged to be
applicable, should be investigated very carefully. Particular attention
should be paid as to whether or not any election is required under the
statute and, if so, whether it is intended to be an election between testa-
mentary and statutory rights or between two statutory rights. In an
Iowa case the decedent, who was domiciled in California, disinherited his
widow in his will."' The widow chose to take homestead by California
law and later claimed her statutory share in Iowa land of the decedent.
The devisees resisted on the basis of the Iowa homestead statute which
provides that any person electing "homestead" waives a right to a statu-
tory share. The court quite properly held the widow was not barred from
claiming her statutory share, for the election referred to in the statute
was between two statutory rights in Iowa land, and the election in Cali-
fornia to take homestead would, therefore, not bar her in Iowa. It
should be noted, however, that, in a case in which Iowa was the domicile,
an election to take homestead would amount to an election against the
will under this statute since it is a substitute for dower or statutory share.
In such a case, the election to take homestead in Iowa should be treated as
binding in another state to bar a claimant from taking under the will but
not under the statute.
The cases involving partial invalidity may concern any devisee or
legatee but often involve the surviving spouse or other person entitled to
a nonbarrable interest. Because of this and the analogous nature of the
authorities, these cases are included in this discussion. Partial invalidity
may be described as partial intestacy by reason of the will's being valid in
one state but not in another, or because of inconsistent clauses, or invalid
clauses. In such a case the beneficiary is usually required to elect be-
tween the interest received under the will and that taken under the statute.
The leading case in the United States is Van Dyke's Appeal,44 in which
the deceased, domiciled in Pennsylvania, where his will was valid, left real
property in New Jersey, where the will was invalid. The court held that
those persons who took the New Jersey land by intestate succession must,
by reason of the doctrine of election, compensate the disappointed "de-
visees" if they were to claim personalty as legatees in Pennsylvania. In a
41. See 1 WoERNmR, op. cit. supra note 11, at 308, 404.
42. Ibid.
43. Ehler v. Ehler, 214 Iowa 789, 243 N.W. 591 (1932).
44. 60 Pa. 481 (1869).
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later case involving similar facts, the Pennsylvania court in reaching
the same result stated:
The orphans' court correctly held that the appellant could
not be permitted to affirm the validity of the will in Pennsyl-
vania and take under it, and at the same time deny its validity in
Washington, to prevent other devisees from taking under it, so
as to draw to himself as heir at law what the testator did not
intend he should have, but had distinctly given to others. If
he will insist on the unjust advantage which the requirement of
three subscribing witnesses under the laws of Maryland gives
him, to defeat the will as to the Washington property he should
be required to make compensation to the disappointed devisees."
While these Pennsylvania cases do not involve the effect in ancillary
proceedings of election at the domicile, they are important background
for any discussion of the partial invalidity cases. A case which illustrates
the strength of the doctrine when election is made at the domicile is
Mechling v. McAllister.4" The widow, in this case, filed an election to
take under the will in Iowa, the domicile. There was a lapse of one-half
the residue, and the widow then claimed her share under the will plus a
share as intestate successor in Minnesota land. The court held the widow
was barred by her Iowa election from taking any share under the laws of
intestacy."
Probably the best known conflicts cases in this area are the McGehee
cases.48 The decedent whose estate was involved died domiciled in South
Carolina, where he left considerable personalty but no real property; he
also left real and personal property in North Carolina, Virginia, and
Maryland. His will, executed while visiting a lawyer relative in North
Carolina, was valid in North Carolina, Maryland, and Virginia but in-
valid at the decedent's domicile in South Carolina because three witnesses
were required there. The will provided $20,000 cash and a $7,500 in-
surance policy for the widow "in lieu of her dower rights." The estate
was first administered as an intestate estate in South Carolina, where the
45. Cummings's Estate, 153 Pa. 397, 399, 25 Atl. 1125, 1126 (1893). The court's
reference to Maryland law was occasioned -by the fact that the land was located in a
portion of Washington, D. C. in which Maryland law continued to be applicable in this
regard.
46. 135 Minn. 357, 160 N.W. 1016 (1917). Cf. Compton v. Akers, 96 Kan. 229, 150
Pac. 219 (1915) ; 1 WOERNER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 400.
47. The result in this case is questionable because of the uncertainty as to whether
it is a case of election between inconsistent rights. While the testator may have in-
tended that his wife receive only one-half if the son were alive, he may well have had a
different intent after the son's death, or at least, the statute of descent and distribution
might properly represent his presumed intention.
48. McGehee v. McGehee, 189 N.C. 558, 127 S.E. 684 (1925) ; McGehee v. McGehee,
152 Md. 661, 136 Atl. 905 (1927).
304
CONFLICT OF LAWS
widow received $36,000 as her intestate share. Next the will was pro-
bated in North Carolina, where the widow claimed her bequest in the will
from the proceeds of the North Carolina land. Other legatees objected,
but in vain because the North Carolina court held that there had been no
previous election and that the widow was entitled to receive the bequest
from the North Carolina land. The court took the view that, since the will
was invalid in South Carolina, the widow had taken neither under the
will nor against it so no election could have occurred. "The plaintiff,"
the court reasoned, "had no alternative as to the personal property. She
could not take her distributive share of it under the will, when the will
failed to dispose of any of the personal property. She could only claim it
under the law, or decline to take it. And upon her refusal to accept her
distributive share of the personal property, what would become of it?
There is no will by which it may be given to others."49
The court considered that no compensation was due the disappointed
legatees since the doctrine of compensation depended upon an election
which did not exist. In reaching its results the North Carolina court
relied on early English cases in which the will was effective to pass per-
sonalty but not realty. The argument by counsel that the results were
extremely harsh was met by the answer that the old English cases were so
well established as to amount to a rule of property. It seems doubtful
that anyone would intentionally leave a will valid in some states but not
at his domicile in reliance on such an anomalous "rule of property." In
refusing to treat the estate as a unit, the court said that, "[i] t cannot be
known judicially that the result we have reached is at variance with the
intention of the testator, for to hold otherwise would be to give effect to
that which the South Carolina law says is void. It is not the testator's
will, but the requirements of the law of a sister State, at which the de-
fendants complain. Just here, we are unable to help them."" °
The proceeds of the North Carolina land were applied to the widow's
bequest, but, since the proceeds were less than the bequest, the widow next
filed suit in Maryland to obtain the "balance" of her bequest by probate
of the will there. Denying her claim, the Maryland court held that the
doctrine of election did apply because the will was valid in Maryland and
because it clearly indicated the testator's intention. Since the widow had
already received over twice that intended for her by the testator, she
could not take more. This view seems preferable to the conceptual ap-
proach of the North Carolina opinion. By forcing the widow to elect,
the North Carolina court could have treated the estate as a whole rather
49. McGehee v. McGehee, 189 N.C. 558, 561, 127 S.E. 684, 685 (1925).
50. Id. at 565, 127 S.E. at 687.
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than give the widow, because of the chance location of assets, more than
she would have received by the law of any state. Perhaps it could be
argued that the problem of protecting against excessive shares being taken
is that of the domicile. If there has been no distribution at the domicile,
this is perhaps possible; however, once the matter has passed beyond the
power of the courts of the domicile, other states only are in a position to
see that the distortion of the testamentary scheme is kept at a minimum.
The ancillary court, in addition, has no real difficulty in determining the
testator's intention since the will is valid in their courts. For these reasons
it would seem that the Maryland court's decision is more just and more
nearly in accord with the reasonable expectations of all parties to the estate.
As to movables in ancillary administration
There are few cases in which difficult conflicts problems of election
are involved in regard to movables in ancillary administration, for when
the matter has arisen, the courts have, with but few exceptions, applied
the law of the domicile.5 Certainly even more reason exists for referring
all of these problems to the domicile than in the case of realty, since
policies referring to the situs of movables are of slight strength.
Two cases inconsistent with the nearly universal rule should be
mentioned. The first, Bolton v. Barnett,2 occurred in Mississippi, where
a statute provides that the law of Mississippi shall govern distribution of
personalty, as well as of realty, located in that state.5" The Mississippi
court indicated that local law would be used to determine matters of elec-
tion at least where original probate of the will was had in Mississippi.
The second inconsistency arose in a New York case, Smith's Estate.54
The deceased had died domiciled in Spain but with his will providing that
New York law should govern. In ancillary administration the widow
elected against the will and asserted a claim based in the alternative upon
New York or Spanish law. The court allowed the widow to elect to take
under the New York law, even though the assets were movables and her
husband was a non-resident, on the theory that inclusion in the will of the
provision for application of New York law included a New York widow's
51. In re Weiss' Will, 64 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1946) ; Singleton v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 191 S.W.2d 143 (Tev. Civ. App. 1945); Hewitt v. Cox, 55 Ark. 225, 17 S.W. 873
(1891); Gibson v. Dowell, 42 Ark. 164 (1883); Mitchell v. Word, 64 Ga. 208 (1879);
Jones v. Gerock, 59 N.C. 190 (1861).
52. 131 Miss. 802, 95 So. 721 (1923). Cf. Doran v. Beale, 106 Miss. 305, 63 So. 647
(1913) ; Slaughter v. Garland, 40 Miss. 172 (1866).
53. Miss. CODE ANN. § 467 (1942). A similar provision in Illinois has recently
been changed to accord with practice elsewhere. ILL. SMITH Hui) ANN. STAT. C. 3, § 162
(Supp. 1954).
54. In re Smith's Estate, 48 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1944). Cf. Sahadi's Estate, 125 N.Y.S2d
204 (1953).
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right to elect against the will. 5 It seems odd that the will should govern
the forced share the widow may take by renouncing it. If this were car-
ried to its logical extreme a testator could elect the law of a state giving
no right to elect and leave substantial personalty there to avoid the widow's
share allowed by the domicile. The policies behind the statutory forced
share give the domicile a dominant interest, and it seems somewhat of a
bootstrap doctrine to permit the testator to determine by his will the law
governing his widow's right to renounce.5" On the other hand, however,
the policies preferring the widow might permit a widow's claim under
the law chosen by her husband if it is more favorable for her to do so
since his personal representative could scarcely claim that only those
parts of the chosen law favorable to the husband were to be considered
applicable."
The cases involving the election problem in relation to family allow-
ances or homestead do not raise problems different from those above
concerning immovables. Likewise the problem of partial invalidity has
not arisen except as previously noted in the cases concerning land." The
solution of potential problems in these areas presumably would be con-
sistent with the previous discussion, permitting the election at the domicile
to control, particularly in view of the usual reference to the domicile for
solution of problems involving succession of movables.
B. EFFECT OF ELECTION MADE IN ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION
As to movables and immovables at the domicile
Movables and immovables located at the domicile are normally
governed by the same local law and so the effect of elections as to both
types of assets can be treated together. The practical control exercised
by the domiciliary forum when the election is first made in ancillary
administration is substantially stronger in most cases than that of the
ancillary forum when election is first made at the domicile. This is
because most decedents leave sufficient property. at their domiciles for
the domiciliary courts effectively to control foreign elections. Also per-
sonal property is ordinarily transmitted to the domicile for distribution,
55. No similar interstate case has come to the writer's attention. See In re Allen,
114 LJ. Ch. 298, 173 L.T. 198; [1945] 2 All E.R. 264. Cf. Kollar v. Noble, 184 Ark. 297,
42 S.W2d 408 (1931). Morris, Conflict of Laws-Commuunlity Property-Doctrine of
Election, 24 CAN. B. REv. 528 (1946).
56. Cf. Bolling v. Bolling, 88 Va. 524, 14 S.E. 67 (1891).
57. But cf. Sahadi's Estate, 125 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1953). Perhaps the solution would
be to apply the law indicated by the testator except where an intention to unreasonably
exclude the widow seems apparent. Cf. Note, Fraud on the Law-The Doctrie of EVa-
sion, 42 CoL. L. REv. 1015 (1942).
58. See pp. 303-306 supra.
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and the domiciliary administration usually is not closed nor is distribu-
tion made, until after the ancillary administrations have been completed.
While it could be urged that person should be bound by his first election
even though made in ancillary administration, no case has been found
where the domiciliary state has raised a complete estoppel solely on this
ground. The courts of the domicile, as well as those sitting in ancillary
administration, have considered the domicile election as the binding one."
This resulif means that an inconsistent position may be taken at the domi-
cile after an election in ancillary administration. However, a previous
election cannot of course be ignored by the domiciliary court, and the
solution has been found in the doctrine of equitable contribution. Illus-
trative of this are the Murphy and Griley cases decided in Florida,6" in
each of which a domiciliary died in Florida leaving property elsewhere.
In each case the widow participated in the foreign ancillary administra-
tion receiving assets of considerable value under the will. Each widow
also subsequently chose to renounce the will and claimed dower in Florida.
The Florida court, on both occasions, concluded that the domiciliary
election governed notwithstanding the prior ancillary election. The
widows, however, were required to account for benefits received else-
where so that they could be set off against a statutory share. If more
than the statutory share had already been received, no more would be paid
but if not, the difference would be made up. This result was reached in
the leading case of Van Dyke's Appeal,6 and the method is particularly
convenient for the domicile state which is the principal place of adminis-
tration and usually the last to distribute.62
It may be suggested that this procedure of controlling foreign dis-
position by modifying the domiciliary distribution is improper. Certainly,
it must be recognized that property actually distributed in foreign ad-
ministrations cannot be taken away. Nevertheless, most cases would
recognize the propriety of the domicile controlling distribution of mov-
able assets wherever located. Particularly as to personal property it seems
proper to permit the domicile to treat the estate as a unit which is subject
59. In re Lawrence's Estate, 93 Vt. 424, 108 Atl. 387 (1919) ; Gibson v. Gibson, 292
F. 657 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ; Russell v. Shapleigh, 275 Mass. 15, 175 N.E. 100 (1931);
Cummings's Estate, 153 Pa. 397, 25 Atl. 1125 (1893) ; Van Dyke's Appeal, 60 Pa. 481
(1869).
60. Griley v. Griley, 43 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949) ; Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855,
170 So. 856 (1936).
61. 60 Pa. 481 (1869).
62. When administration is closed at the domicile before the ancillary administration
is closed it would seem reasonable for the ancillary administration to salvage the testator's
plan as against the scheme of distribution at the testator's domicile. See McGehee v.
McGehee, 152 Md. 661, 136 AUt. 905 (1927). Cf. Pearce v. Pearce, 281 Ill. 194, 118 N.E.
84 (1917).
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to their laws, and probably even to the extent of using retaliatory decrees
if necessary. 3 But even as to foreign real property there seems reason
to permit the domicile to adjust its own distribution to compensate for
an inconsistent election in another state. This is because there is effec-
tive evidence of what the testator intended in a will valid by at least some
law, usually that of the domicile. Further, the domicile is not substitut-
ing its law for that of the foreign situs but is in effect merely preventing
the claimant from taking inconsistent positions which would thwart the
purpose of the laws of both states. The procedure followed in the
Murphy, Griley, and Van Dyke cases6 seems consistent with the general
trend of giving less effect to the doctrine of arbitrary election whenever
it causes forfeiture; for example, many states permit revocation of an
election under local dower statutes when no harm results to others.65 The
technique of treating an ancillary election 'only as a set-off against the
claim at the domicile recognizes that the estate is a unit even though its
assets are located in several states. There probably are situations in
which the location of the domicile may be uncertain, the existence of as-
sets doubtful, or in which even fraudulent concealment of assets by the
decedent may not be discovered until some acts constituting an election
have been done in a state of ancillary administration. There seems little
reason why the spouse should not be permitted to change her position if
no one is harmed as a consequence. To permit such a reversal will recog-
nize the local law policies protecting the widow and members of the family
and at the same time will protect third persons. It can be argued that
the same reasoning would allow the widow to change her mind after a
final election at the domicile and take differently in the ancillary adminis-
tration. When the domicile has lost its control by distribution, it seems
that the ancillary administration could assume control if its assets are
sufficient; it seems clear, however, that this converse situation should not
be permitted in absence of fraud or other unusual circumstances. There
should be one standard against which to measure finally the act of elec-
tion and the receipt of benefits in the estate, and states should not permit
"competitive" administrations but should give effect to policies recogniz-
ing the state with the dominant interests.66 In view of the present relative
importance of personal property and the "family" nature of these estate
63. Griley v. Griley, 43 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949); Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855,
170 So. 856 (1936) ; In re Lawrence's Estate, 93 Vt. 424, 108 Atl. 387 (1919) ; Cummings's
Estate, 153 Pa. 397, 25 Atl. 1125 (1893) ; Van Dyke's Appeal, 60 Pa. 481 (1869). See
also Caruso v. Caruso, 106 N.J. Eq. 130, 148 Atl. 882 (1930).
64. See p. 308 supra.
65. Note, Dower: Estoppel by Widow's Election Under Will, 3 U. OF FLA. L. REV.
214 (1950).
66. See Caruso v. Caruso, 106 N.J. Eq. 130, 148 At. 882 (1930). -
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
problems, the domicile seems to be the focal point; accordingly, it seems
reasonable to govern elections in administration of decedents' estates by
the law of the domicile and to control dispositions elsewhere by the elec-
tions made at the domicile as long as no third parties are injured.
As to movables and immovables in a second ancillary administration
Very few opinions actually involving this point have been handed
down. The cases in point have involved a prior claim under the will
where a disclaimer has been precluded in the second ancillary administra-
tion." In cases of inconsistent elections at the domicile and in first an-
cillary administration, the court in the second ancillary administration
would probably abide by the domicile election or, at least, would refuse
recovery of more than would be allowed under the larger of the two in-
terests. Probably a second ancillary administration would not ignore
either prior administration but would require accounting and set-off of
both as in the Maryland case involving the McGehee estate."8
C. CONCLUSIONS
In all of the conflict of laws problems concerning elections in de-
cedents' estates discussed there appears a need for a single standard
against which to measure benefits and elections. It should be recognized
that local law provisions for protection of persons interested in estates are
drawn with an eye to a single system of law. The policies underlying the
protective provisions should not be destroyed or unduly enlarged because
the property may be found in different places. So far as possible, pro-
tection should be given, and according to a single standard. In a society
in which personal property constitutes the bulk of wealth, the domicile
has the greatest claim as this single reference. Similarly, policies con-
cerning the protection of the family and its interests seem to center at
the domicile. While regularity of title to real property is important so
far as third parties are concerned, there seems little reason why the courts
of the situs should not defer to the domicile in litigation within the estate;
such an approach would give appropriate effect to local policies while
recognizing that each state is an integral part of the interstate and inter-
national system upon which all are in part dependent.
67. McGehee v. McGehee, 152 Md. 661, 136 Ati. 905 (1927), discussed at pp. 304-306
supra; Pearce v. Pearce, 281 Ill. 194, 118 N.E. 84 (1917).
68. See discussion pp. 304-306 supra.
